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Abstract. In an (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge proof of partial knowledge, introduced by Cramer,
Damgård and Schoenmakers (CRYPTO 1994), a prover knowing witnesses for some k-subset of n
given public statements can convince the verifier of this claim without revealing which k-subset. The
accompanying solution cleverly combines Σ-protocol theory and arithmetic secret sharing, and achieves
linear communication complexity for general k, n. Especially the “one-out-of-n” case k = 1 has seen
myriad applications during the last decades, e.g., in electronic voting, ring signatures, and confidential
transaction systems in general.
In this paper we focus on the discrete logarithm (DL) setting, where the prover claims knowledge
of DLs of k-out-of-n given elements. Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015) have shown how to
solve the special case k = 1 with logarithmic (in n) communication, instead of linear as prior work.
However, their method takes explicit advantage of k = 1 and does not generalize to k > 1 without
losing all advantage over prior work. Alternatively, an indirect approach for solving the considered
problem is by translating the k-out-of-n relation into a circuit and then applying recent advances in
communication-efficient circuit ZK. Indeed, for the k = 1 case this approach has been highly optimized,
e.g., in ZCash.
Our main contribution is a new, simple honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof protocol for proving knowl-
edge of k out of n DLs with logarithmic communication and for general k and n, without requiring
any generic circuit ZK machinery. Our approach deploys a novel twist on compressed Σ-trotocol the-
ory (CRYPTO 2020) that we then utilize to compress a carefully chosen adaptation of the CRYPTO
1994 approach down to logarithmic size. Interestingly, even for k = 1 and general n our approach
improves prior direct approaches as it reduces prover complexity without increasing the communication
complexity. Besides the conceptual simplicity, we also identify regimes of practical relevance where our
approach achieves asymptotic and concrete improvements, e.g., in proof size and prover complexity,
over the generic approach based on circuit-ZK.
Finally, we show various extensions and generalizations of our core result. For instance, we extend our
protocol to proofs of partial knowledge of Pedersen (vector) commitment openings, and/or to include
a proof that the witness satisfies some additional constraint, and we show how to extend our results to
non-threshold access structures.
Keywords: Proofs of Partial Knowledge, One-out-of-Many, Compressed Σ-Protocol Theory, Zero-
Knowledge, Secure Algorithmics, Ring-Signatures.
1 Introduction
1.1 Proofs of Partial Knowledge and their Applications
Proofs of partial knowledge [CDS94] allow a prover to convince a verifier that the prover knows k out
of n secrets, without revealing which secrets the prover knows. Typically, these secrets are solutions to
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public instances of intractable problems, such as the discrete logarithm problem. The work of [CDS94] gives
an elegant solution with linear communication complexity that cleverly combines Σ-protocol theory with
arithmetic secret sharing. Our goal is to invoke the techniques of Bulletproofs [BCC+16, BBB+18] and
follow-up work, in particular the compressed Σ-protocol framework of [AC20], to construct proofs of partial
knowledge with logarithmic communication complexity.
Compressed Σ-protocol theory [AC20] was introduced as a strengthening of Σ-protocol theory. It inherits
the flexibility and versatility of Σ-protocols while compressing their communication complexity from linear
to logarithmic. The main pivot of this theory is a standard Σ-protocol for opening linear forms on Pedersen
vector commitments, i.e., a Σ-protocol for proving that a committed vector x satisfies L(x) = y for a
public linear form L and a public scalar y. By an appropriate adaptation of the techniques from [BCC+16,
BBB+18] this pivotal Σ-protocol is compressed to achieve communication complexity that is logarithmic in
the dimension of x; additionally a linearization approach to handle non-linearities is described [AC20]. As
one of the applications of this theory it was shown how to obtain circuit zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols with
logarithmic communication complexity for arbitrary arithmetic circuits.
An obvious approach for constructing proofs of partial knowledge with logarithmic complexity is to ap-
ply recent advances in communication efficient circuit ZK to a suitably constructed circuit for capturing the
k-out-of-n relation. For instance, this is how the decentralized and confidential transaction system ZCash is
designed [HBHW20]. In this work here, we take a more direct approach that avoids generic circuit techniques.
Our approach follows the paradigm of [CDS94] of combining arithmetic secret sharing, but now with com-
pressed Σ-protocol theory to achieve logarithmic communication complexity. We find such a direct solution
scientifically more appealing, but there are also efficiency considerations that may make our solution the
preferred choice. We discuss this in detail in Section 1.3.
Proofs of partial knowledge have seen myriad applications during the last decades. For instance, they
were shown to be applicable to the construction of group signature schemes [Cam97]. Group signature
schemes [CvH91] allow a member of a group to sign a message without revealing which member it is, while
a designated group manager is capable of revoking the anonymity of the signer.
Another application is to ring signature schemes [RST01], which do not contain such a revocation mecha-
nism. In a ring signature scheme, a group member can select any ad-hoc subset of group members and anony-
mously sign a message on behalf of this subset. Here, 1-out-of-n proofs together with the Fiat-Shamir [FS86]
heuristic allow for a straightforward construction of ring-signature schemes. Because of the ad-hoc nature a
ring signature must contain a list of the subset’s members and, therefore, its size grows linearly in the size
of the ring; however, in many practical scenario’s the costs of specifying a ring can be amortized over many
instances.
Proofs of partial knowledge, in particular in the form of ring signature schemes, also play a crucial role in
confidential decentralized transaction system such as Zerocoin [MGGR13]. Zerocoin was proposed as an ex-
tension of Bitcoin to provide stronger privacy guarantees. A Zerocoin transaction requires a ZKPoK that the
transferred coin is an element of a public set of unspent coins. Other decentralized payment systems that rely
on 1-out-of-n proofs to provide confidentiality are, e.g., Lelantus [Jiv19], ZCash [HBHW20], Zether [BAZB20]
and Monero [Ser20].
As a generalization of ring signature schemes, threshold ring signatures only allow a large enough subset
to compute a valid signature [BSS02]. These schemes require a generalization of the special proof of partial
knowledge case k = 1. For instance, Monero is actively working on threshold ring signature schemes [GN18].
Moreover, in [Dia20], it is shown how their generalization from 1-out-of-n proofs to so-called many-out-of-
many proofs improves the communication complexity of the Zether payment system. They show that many
practical scenarios require more general proofs of partial knowledge than only 1-out-of-n proofs.
1.2 Contributions
In this work, we start off by introducing and analyzing a novel twist on the core compression protocol from
compressed Σ-protocol theory [AC20]. Namely, we observe that the compressed Σ-protocol for opening linear
forms can be adapted to apply to general homomorphisms, i.e., for proving that a committed vector x ∈ Znq
satisfies f(x) = y for an arbitrary group homomorphism f : Znq → G and an element y ∈ G. The loss of
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efficiency is at most a constant factor and the adapted protocol still achieves a logarithmic communication
complexity. Furthermore, the amortization technique to open multiple linear forms for essentially the price
of one [AC20] directly carries over to opening multiple homomorphisms. This generalized functionality has
not been considered before in the context of logarithmic complexity. However, as we discuss below, it turns
out to be very useful in the design of efficient proofs of partial knowledge, but possibly also beyond.
Indeed, given n group elements P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G, consider a prover claiming that it knows k out of the n
DLs, i.e., it knows a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality k and exponents xi ∈ Zq such that gxi = Pi for all
i ∈ S. Following the design principle of [CDS94], we reduce this k-out-of-n case to the n-out-of-n case by
having the prover “eliminate” the exponents that it does not know, and then we apply the amortized version
of the new compressed Σ-protocol for opening homomorphisms to prove the n instances in one go, with
logarithmic complexity. In more detail, the prover first chooses an (n−k+ 1)-out-of-n Shamir secret sharing
(s1, . . . , sn) of the default secret s = 1, where it selects the non-constant “random” coefficients a1, . . . , an−k
of the sharing polynomial p(X) = 1 +
∑n−k
i=1 aiX
i so that si = 0 for i 6∈ S. The prover then commits to the
vector (a, t) = (a1, . . . , an−k, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Z2n−kq with ti set to ti = sixi for any i, understood to be equal to
0 for i /∈ S, i.e., when si = 0. Finally, it proves that
gti = P sii
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By the linearity of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, for any i this relation can be cast as
a homomorphism of the committed values a1, . . . , an−k, t1, . . . , tn, 2 and thus our adaptation of [AC20], in-
cluding the amortization over the n homomorphisms, applies, thereby achieving a logarithmic communication
complexity.
In total, our k-out-of-n proof protocol requires the prover to send 4 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e−5 group elements
and 4 elements in Zq to the verifier. We also show how to further reduce this to 2 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e−1 group
elements and 4 elements in Zq on a pairing-based platform. The protocol is public-coin and can therefore
be made non-interactive by the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86]. The public set-up, necessary for the vector
commitment, consists of at most 2n group elements, and the complexity of the prover scales linearly in n.
The conceptual simplicity of our design principle makes it easy to extend the protocol in various directions,
for instance to proofs of partial knowledge about “multi-generator discrete logarithms” and corresponding
Pedersen vector commitments. Moreover, we show that our proofs of partial knowledge are compatible with
circuit ZK protocols of [AC20], allowing the prover to demonstrate that his secret information satisfies some
arbitrary given constraint. Finally, we generalize the results from threshold access structures to arbitrary
access structures.
1.3 Comparison with Other Approaches
Achieving partial proofs of knowledge with logarithmic complexity has received quite some attention over
the last few years, with different approaches and different (partial) solutions. We discuss here the examples
that are most relevant in the context of our new approach, and we compare them with our results.
In [GK15], Groth and Kohlweiss consider the special case k = 1, and where the prover claims to be able
to open 1 out of n public commitments to zero. Their solution is a Σ-protocol that works for any additively
homomorphic commitment scheme over Zq and it achieves a logarithmic communication complexity. To
describe their approach, let 1 ≤ ` ≤ n be the index of the prover’s secret. The prover commits to each bit
of ` and runs dlog2(n)e standard Σ-protocols, in parallel and on a common challenge, proving that all these
commitments can indeed be opened to a binary value. In addition, the prover shows that the responses of
these parallel Σ-protocols satisfy some multiplicative relation, which completes the protocol. This approach
does not have an obvious generalization to k-out-of-n proofs.
The 1-out-of-n proof of [GK15] requires the prover to send 4 dlog2(n)e group elements and 3 dlog2(n)e+1
field elements. By using Pedersen vector commitments, instead of ordinary Pedersen commitment, the




j , and we ask the prover to prove that the committed values map to Pi.
3
communication costs can be further reduced to dlog2(n)e + 4 group elements and dlog2(n)e + 3 field el-
ements [BCC+15]. Instead of the binary decomposition, the approach of [BCC+15] considers the m-ary
decomposition of the secret index `. Here, we have optimized their approach for proving knowledge of 1-out-
of-n discrete logarithms by taking m = 2. The work or [BCC+15] focuses on a slightly different scenario in
which the communication costs are minimized for m = 4.
In comparison, in our protocol, which works for any k, the prover sends 4 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e − 5 group
elements and 4 field elements to the verifier, which is reduced to 2 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e−1 group elements and 4
field elements on a pairing-based platform. Hence, perhaps surprisingly, our simple protocols are comparable
to dedicated solutions for the special case k = 1.
Recently, a generalization from 1-out-of-n proofs of [GK15] to “many-out-of-many” proofs was
given [Dia20]. This generalization considers a prover that claims to know the opening of all commitments
in one of the orbits of a public permutation of n public commitments. However, the protocol only works for
permutations with orbits of equal size. Since the permutation is public and of this specific form, this protocol
does not constitute a general k-out-of-n proof of partial knowledge.









, where κ is the computational security




. Here and below, we express the prover
complexity in terms of the number of group operations required. Note that, a single exponentiation requires
O(κ) = O(log(q)) group operations. By contrast, some other authors express the prover complexity in the
number of exponentiations. Similarly, we specify the communication costs in terms of the number group and
field elements.
Aiming to improve the prover complexity of the 1-out-of-n proofs of [GK15, BCC+15], Jivanyan and
Mamikonyan [JM20] proposed an hierarchical approach. Their protocol assumes that n = NM and applies
an appropriate 1-out-of-N proof followed by a 1-out-of-M proof. It reduces the prover complexity from
O(κn log(n)) down to O
(
κ(n+N log(N) +M log(M))
)
, which equals O(κn) if, for example, N = M =
√
n.
However, this hierarchical approach increases the communication complexity to O
(
N log(N) +M log(M) +
M
)
, hence it is subject to a trade-off between prover and communication complexity.
Alternatively to our and the above approaches, proofs of partial knowledge can be constructed via generic
circuit ZK protocols. This indirect approach is, for example, followed by the confidential transaction system
ZCash [HBHW20]. A standard construction for the 1-out-of-n case is to incorporate the group elements Pi
into a Merkle tree [Mer80], and ask the prover to prove knowledge of an exponent xi such that the group
element gxi is the leaf of a valid, but secret, Merkle path. In this case, the arithmetic circuit C implements
a composition of the exponentiation gxi and the log2(n) hash function evaluations corresponding to the





Even though this is obviously possible, to our knowledge this Merkle-tree approach has not been explicitly
generalized to the k-out-of-n case before, making it difficult to do a rigorous efficiency comparison. However,





. In addition, the circuit has to validate that the k Merkle paths are distinct. The obvious way
to do this requires a circuit of size O(k2). In these complexity estimates we neglect the O(κn) size circuit
required to construct the Merkle tree, because these costs can be amortized in some applications.
In Table 1, the asymptotic complexities of our direct approach are compared with the indirect approach,
instantiated with typical communication efficient circuit ZK protocols for which the size of the public param-
eters and the prover complexity are linear and the communication complexity is logarithmic in the circuit
size. We observe that, if k = Ω (
√
n), our approach yields an asymptotic improvement over the indirect
approach.
Moreover, the constants of our approach are small. By contrast, taking for instance the case k = 1 and a
highly optimized group, associated to a security parameter κ ≈ 100, the indirect approach can be instantiated
with arithmetic circuits containing approximately 1400 log2(n) multiplication gates [HBHW20]. Hence, even
for the 1-out-of-n case, where the indirect approach has better asymptotic complexities, we obtain better
communication complexity for n ranging up to roughly 9000.
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Table 1. Comparison of the asymptotic complexities of the indirect approach, using typical communication-efficient
circuit ZK protocols, and our direct approach, for k-out-of-n proofs of partial knowledge, with security parameter κ.
Indirect Circuit ZK Approach Our Direct Approach
Size of Public Parameters O
(
























The above circuit approach can further be adjusted, for instance by invoking ZK protocols with constant
communication complexity [Gro10], or by replacing Merkle trees with RSA-accumulators [BdM93], which
results in arithmetic circuits with a number of multiplication gates that is constant in n [STY00]. However,
these approaches are incomparable in that they are based on computational hardness assumptions that
are considered less standard, like the strong-RSA assumption or the knowledge-of-exponent assumption.
Furthermore, in these protocols, the size of the public parameters and the prover complexity are still linear
in the circuit size, and for practical instances still result in sizeable circuits, respectively.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the notation and some of the results
from compressed Σ-protocol theory [AC20]. In Section 3, we describe our twist on the pivotal Σ-protocol
from [AC20]. In Section 4, we combine this generalization with an adaptation of the techniques from [CDS94]
to construct our proof of partial knowledge. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss a number of extensions and
generalizations of our proofs of partial knowledge.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Interactive Proofs
We briefly introduce the concept of an interactive proof3 and some of the basic (security) properties. An
interactive proof Π for relation R is a protocol between prover P and a verifier V. It takes as public input
the statement x and as prover’s private input the witness w, which is written as Input(x;w). As the output
of the protocol the verifier either accepts or rejects the prover’s claim of knowing a witness w. Π is called
(perfectly) complete if on any input (x;w) ∈ R the verifier always accepts. Evaluating Π on input (x;w) is
also written as Π(x;w).
An interactive proof with µ communication rounds is also called a µ-move protocol. Note that the final
message is always sent from the prover to the verifier. The messages communicated in one protocol evaluation
are also referred to as a conversation or a transcript. If all the messages from the verifier to the prover consist
of random coins chosen by the verifier, one speaks of a public-coin protocol. All our protocols will be public-
coin and thereby suitable for the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86], which turns public-coin interactive
proofs into non-interactive protocols.
An interactive proof Π for relation R is said to have witness extended emulation [Lin03] if there exists
algorithm χ (witness extended emulator) that runs in expected polynomial time and does the following. The
algorithm χ, on input x and given rewindable oracle access to a (possibly dishonest) prover P∗, outputs
a transcript and a witness w such that: (1) the emulated transcript is statistically indistinguishable from
conversations between P∗ and an honest verifier V, and (2) the probability that the emulated transcript is
accepting and the witness w is not a valid witness for x is negligible. Witness extended emulation gives a
notion for proofs of knowledge (PoKs) that is sufficient in practical applications [BCC+16, BBB+18, AC20].
3 In contrast to the original definition [GMR85], we do not require an interactive proof to be complete and sound
by definition; instead, we consider those (and other) properties as desirable security properties.
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We also consider the computational version of a PoK, where witness extended emulation is required to
hold only for computationally bounded dishonest provers under a computational hardness assumption. In
those cases, the relation R typically depends on a (possibly implicit) security parameter, as well as on some
additional public parameters that are assumed to be chosen according to a specific probability distribution,
and the success probability of the prover is then understood to be on average over the choice of these public
parameters. These computational variants of proofs of knowledge are also called arguments of knowledge.
Protocol Π is called honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) if there exists an efficient simulator that,
on input a statement x that admits a witness w, outputs an accepting transcript, such that the simulated
transcripts follow exactly the same distribution as transcripts between an honest prover and an honest
verifier.
A 3-move public-coin interactive proof is called a Σ-protocol. The 3 messages are then typically denoted
(a, c, z) where c is called the challenge. For a HVZK Σ-protocol the simulator often proceeds by first selecting
a random challenge c and then preparing the messages a and z; in this case, we speak of special honest verifier
zero-knowledge (SHVZK).
A Σ-protocol is called k-special sound if there exists an efficient algorithm that, on input any statement
x and k accepting transcripts (a, c1, z1), . . . , (a, ck, zk) with common first message a and pairwise distinct
challenges ci, outputs a witness w for x.
More generally, we consider (2µ+ 1)-move public-coin protocols, in which all the verifier’s messages are
uniformly random challenges. These protocols are called (k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound if there exists an efficient
algorithm that, on input any statement x and a (k1, k2, . . . , kµ)-tree of accepting transcripts, outputs a
witness w for x. A (k1, k2, . . . , kµ)-tree of accepting transcripts is a set of
∏µ
i=1 ki accepting transcripts that
are arranged in the following tree structure. The nodes in this tree correspond to the prover’s messages and
the edges correspond to the verifier’s challenges. Every node at depth i has precisely ki children corresponding
to ki pairwise distinct challenges. Every transcript corresponds to exactly one path from the root node to a
leaf node.
We note that in some public-coin protocols the verifier sends µ challenges in less than 2µ+ 1 rounds, i.e.,
some of the verifier’s messages contain more than one challenge. For these protocols, we also consider the
(k1, . . . , kµ)-special soundness property. In this case, a (k1, k2, . . . , kµ)-tree of accepting transcripts contains
nodes that do not correspond to a message sent from the prover to the verifier.
Let us assume that the challenges are sampled uniformly at random from challenge sets with a cardinality
that is exponential in the security parameter. In this work all challenge sets are equal to Zq ∼= Z/(qZ) for
some prime q that is understood to be exponential in the security parameter. Hence, for the protocols in this
work this assumption is satisfied. Then witness extended emulation is known to follow from (k1, k2, . . . , kµ)-
special soundness [BCC+16]. In this work, we will show that all protocols are (k1, k2, . . . , kµ)-special sound
for some µ and some list of ki’s, from which witness extended emulation therefore follows.
2.2 Multi-Exponentiation and The Pedersen Vector Commitment Scheme
We consider statements over the ring Zq ∼= Z/(qZ) with q prime. We let G be an Abelian group of prime
order q for which we write its group operation multiplicatively. We write vectors in Znq or Gn in boldface,




gxii ∈ G .
Furthermore, for vectors x,y ∈ Znq , g,h ∈ Gn and scalar c ∈ Zq, we have the following component-wise
operations:
g ∗ h := (g1h1, g2h2, . . . , gnhn) ∈ Gn, gc := (gc1, gc2, . . . , gcn) ∈ Gn and x ∗ y := (x1y1, x2y2, . . . , xnyn) ∈ Znq .
Additionally, assuming n is even, we write gL := (g1, . . . , gn/2),gR := (gn/2+1, . . . , gn) ∈ Gn/2 and xL :=
(x1, . . . , xn/2),xR := (xn/2+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Z
n/2
q , for the left and right halves of these vectors.
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We let GT be another Abelian group and denote the set of all group homomorphisms f : Znq → GT by
Hom(Znq ,GT ). Typically GT = G or GT = Zq, in the latter case Hom(Znq ,GT ) = Hom(Znq ,Zq) is the set of
linear forms on Znq . For any homomorphism f : Znq → GT it holds that its image im(f) ⊂ GT is a Zq-module.
For this reason, and without loss of generality, we assume that GT is a Zq-module.
Moreover, we define the left and right part of f as follows:
fL : Zn/2q → GT , x 7→ f(x, 0),
fR : Zn/2q → GT , x 7→ f(0,x),
(1)
where, e.g., (x, 0) ∈ Znq is the vector x ∈ Z
n/2
q appended with n/2 zeros.
In this work we also consider the Pedersen vector commitment scheme. This commitment scheme allows
a prover to (compactly) commit to an n-dimensional vector x ∈ Znq in a single group element P ∈ G. We
recall that a Pedersen vector commitment P is simply a multi-exponentiation, i.e.,
P = hγgx,
for public parameters h ∈ G and g ∈ Gn and for a (private) γ ∈ Zq sampled uniformly at random by the
prover.
The Pedersen vector commitment scheme is perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the
discrete logarithm assumption. More precisely, the commitment scheme is binding under the assumption





Such a non-zero vector (γ, x1, . . . , xn) is also called a non-trivial discrete log relation for group elements
h, g1, . . . , gn. From here on forward, we assume that these group elements have been sampled uniformly at
random in a setup phase and that the prover does not know a non-trivial discrete logarithm (DL) rela-
tion. These group elements form the set of public parameters for all our protocols. We say a protocol is
computationally (k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, if (k1, . . . , kµ)-special
soundness holds under the assumption that a prover does not know a non-trivial DL relation between the
public parameters.
3 Proving Group Homomorphism Openings on Multi-Exponentiations
In this section, we construct an interactive proof for proving that a secret multi-exponent x ∈ Znq for a public
multi-exponentiation P = gx ∈ G is mapped to a given public value y under an arbitrary but given group
homomorphism f : Znq → GT . Our new protocol has a communication complexity that is logarithmic in the
dimension n. By considering one of the coordinates of x to be “the randomness”, and considering an f that
ignores this coordinate, we immediately get a protocol that applies to Pedersen vector commitments and
proves that the committed vector satisfied the relation defined by the considered group homomorphism and
the target value P .
Our approach for constructing said protocol is as follows. We start with the canonical Σ-protocol for
the considered problem of proving f(x) = y (Section 3.1), and we then adapt the compression mechanism
of [AC20] such that it is applicable to our setting. Indeed, our setting is a generalization of [AC20], which
applies to the special case where f is a linear form L : Znq → Zq. This then results in a compressed Σ-protocol
that features the claimed logarithmic complexity (Section 3.3).
Later in the section, we also discuss a couple of (standard) amortization techniques applied to our protocol,
for instance for proving fi(x) = yi for several group homomorphisms fi at (essentially) the cost of proving
one.
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3.1 The Standard Σ-protocol for Opening Homomorphisms
We consider the problem of proving that the multi-exponent x of a multi-exponentiation P = gx is mapped
to a certain value y under a given homomorphism f ∈ Hom(Zq,GT ), i.e., that f(x) = y, without revealing x.
More concretely, we want to construct PoK protocols for the relation
Rf =
{ (
P ∈ G, y ∈ GT ; x ∈ Znq
)
: P = gx, y = f(x)
}
. (2)
Protocol 1, denoted by Π0, is the canonical Σ-protocol for this relation Rf , following the generic construc-
tion design for q-one-way group homomorphisms4 [Cra96, CD98]. The properties of Π0, known to hold for
this generic construction, are summarized in Theorem 1. Note that the only difference between this protocol
and Protocol 2 of [AC20] is that here we consider multi-exponentiations and general group homomorphisms
instead of Pedersen commitments and linear forms.
Theorem 1 (Homomorphism Evaluation). Π0 is a Σ-protocol for relation Rf . It is perfectly complete,
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally special sound. Moreover, the communication costs
are:
– P → V: 1 element of G, 1 element of GT and n elements of Zq.
– V → P: 1 element of Zq.
Protocol 1 Σ-protocol Π0 for relation Rf
Opening a homomorphism on a Pedersen vector commitment.
Public Parameters : g ∈ Gn,
Input(P, y; x)
P = gx ∈ G








z = cx + r
z−−−−−−→
gz ?= AP c
f(z) ?= cy + t
3.2 Compression mechanism
The Σ-protocol Π0 for opening homomorphisms has a linear communication complexity. We now deploy
the techniques from [BCC+16, BBB+18, AC20] to compress the communication complexity from linear to
logarithmic. A first observation is that the verifier’s final check verifies that
(AP c, cy + t; z) ∈ Rf ,
4 Here, applied to the q-one-way group homomorphisms Znq → G×GT , x 7→ (gx, f(x)).
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i.e., that the prover’s final message z is a witness with respect to the same relation Rf for the statement
(AP c, cy+t); which is computed by the verifier. This is no coincidence; this holds generically for this standard
construction of Σ-protocols for q-one-way group homomorphisms. The final message of Π0 can therefore be
understood as a trivial PoK for relation Rf , and replacing this trivial PoK by a more efficient one will reduce
the communication complexity without affecting security (significantly). In particular, the alternative PoK
does not have to be zero-knowledge since the trivial one obviously is not.
Our compression mechanism is thus an interactive proof Π1 for relation Rf that is not zero-knowledge
anymore but has improved efficiency. The compression mechanism is very similar to the one used in [AC20].
The difference is that we consider the more general case of opening arbitrary group homomorphisms, rather
than restricting ourselves to linear forms. This generalization requires a minor adaptation. The first step in
the compression of [AC20] is namely to incorporate the linear form evaluation into the multi-exponentiation
as an additional exponent on a new generator k ∈ G. This reduction step does not apply to the general
case of opening arbitrary group homomorphisms, and is therefore omitted in our protocols. For this reason
we directly apply (a minor adaptation of) the main compression mechanism of [AC20]; ultimately this will
increase the communication costs of the compressed Σ-protocol by roughly a factor two when compared to
opening linear forms. However, in contrast to the compressed Σ-protocol for opening linear forms [AC20],
our protocol is unconditionally sound rather than computationally. In Section 5.1, we show how a more
general class of homomorphisms can be incorporated into the commitment, thereby avoiding the factor two
loss in the communication efficiency.
The compression mechanism, i.e., our protocol Π1 for relation Rf that has improved efficiency but is not
zero-knowledge, is described in Protocol 2 below. Here, n is assumed to be even, which is without loss of
generality (if not the witness can be appended with a zero). Also, recall that xL := (x1, . . . , xn/2) equals the
left half of the vector x ∈ Znq and that fR(xL) := f(0, . . . , 0,xL), etc.
Before discussing the security of Π1 as a proof of knowledge in Theorem 2, we emphasize the following two
important properties of Π1. The size of the response has halved compared to the original protocol Π0, and
thereby the communication costs are reduced by roughly a factor two, and second, verifying the correctness
of the response is again by means of checking whether it is a witness for the relation Rf ′ , now instantiated





Protocol 2 Compression Mechanism Π1 for relation Rf .
Public Parameters : g
Input(P, y; x)
P = gx ∈ G
y = f(x) ∈ GT
Prover Verifier
A = gxLR , a = fR(xL)




g′ := gcL ∗ gR ∈ Gn/2
Q := AP cBc
2
f ′ := cfL + fR
z = xL + cxR
z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (g′)z ?= Q
f ′(z) ?= a+ cy + c2b
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Theorem 2 (Compression Mechanism). Let n ∈ Z>0 be even. Then Π1 is a 3-move protocol for relation
Rf . It is perfectly complete and unconditionally 3-special sound. Moreover, the communication costs are:
– P → V: 2 elements of G, 2 elements of GT and n/2 elements of Zq.
– V → P: 1 element of Zq.
Proof. Completeness follows directly.
Special Soundness: We show that the protocol is 3-special sound, i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm
that on input three accepting transcripts computes a witness for relation Rf .
Let (A,B, a, b, c1, z1), (A,B, a, b, c2, z2) and (A,B, a, b, c3, z3) be three accepting transcripts for distinct












Note that, since the challenges are distinct, this Vandermonde matrix is invertible and a solution to this
equation exists. We define z̄ =
∑3
i=1 ai(cizi, zi) for which it is easily verified that
gz̄ = P and f(z̄) = y.
Hence, z̄ is a witness for relation Rf , which completes the proof.
3.3 Compressed Σ-protocol
Finally, we compose Σ-protocol Π0 and its compression mechanism Π1 to obtain a compressed Σ-protocol
for opening homomorphisms on multi-exponentiations gx such as Pedersen vector commitments. We follow
the notation of [AC20] and write Πb Πa for the composition of two composable interactive proof Πa and
Πb. Protocols Πa and Πb are composable if protocol Πb is a PoK for the prover’s final message of protocol
Πa. Recall that this composition means that the final message of protocol Πa is replaced by an execution of
protocol Πb.
We assume that n is a power of two, if it is not the witness can be appended with zeros such that its
dimension is a power of 2. For n ≤ 2 it is optimal to omit the compression mechanism, for this reason it
is assumed that n > 2. To minimize the communication complexity we recursively apply the compression
protocol Π1 until the dimension of the witness is reduced to four, i.e., µ = dlog2(n)e − 2 times. For this
composition we write
Πc = Π1  · · · Π1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ times
Π0. (3)
Theorem 3 captures the security and efficiency properties of Protocol Πc.
Theorem 3 (Compressed Σ-Protocol for Opening Homomorphisms). Let n > 2, then Πc is a
(2µ + 3)-move protocol for relation Rf , where µ = dlog2(n)e − 2. It is perfectly complete, special honest-
verifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally (2, k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound, where ki = 3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ µ.
Moreover, the communication costs are:
– P → V: 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of G, 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of GT and 4 elements of Zq.
– V → P: dlog2(n)e − 1 elements of Zq.
Proof. Completeness follows in a straightforward manner.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge follows since Π0 is SHVZK. A simulator for Πc runs
the simulator for Π0, and replaces the final messages of the simulated transcripts by honest executions of
Π1  · · · Π1.
Special Soundness: Since the protocol is the composition of protocols that are 2- or 3-special sound,
it is easily seen that Πc is (2, 3, . . . , 3)-special sound, i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm that on input a
(2, 3, . . . , 3)-tree (depth µ+ 1) of 2 · 3µ accepting transcripts computes a witness for relation Rf .
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Remark 1. We explicitly emphasize once more that the above and below results on opening homomorphisms
f(x) on multi-exponentiations gx immediately carry over to opening homomorphisms f(x) on Pedersen
vector commitments gxhγ , simply by renaming the involved variables in the obvious way.
3.4 Amortization Techniques
This section describes two standard amortization techniques. First, we consider the scenario where a prover
wishes to open one homomorphism f on many multi-exponentiations P1, . . . , Ps, i.e., we consider the relation
RAmorExp =
{
(P1, . . . , Ps, y1, . . . , ys; x1, . . . ,xs) : P1 = gx1 , y1 = f(x1), . . . , P1 = gx1 , ys = f(xs)
}
. (4)
The standard (amortized) Σ-protocol for relation RAmorExp is similar to Σ-protocol Π0 for relation Rf :
it has the same first two moves, but then the prover’s final response is z = r +
∑s
i=1 c
ixi and the verifier
checks that gz = AP c1 · · ·P c
s
s and f(z) = t + cy + · · · + csys. The communication costs of the amortized
Σ-protocol are exactly equal to the communication costs of protocol Π0 and the compression mechanism
applies as before. We denote the compressed amortized Σ-protocol for relation RAmorExp by ΠAmorExp. Its
main properties are summarized in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Amortization over Many Multi-Exponentiations). Let n > 2, then ΠAmorExp is a
(2µ + 3)-move protocol for relation RAmorExp, where µ = dlog2(n)e − 2. It is perfectly complete, special
honest-verifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally (s + 1, k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound, where ki = 3 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ µ. Moreover, the communication costs are:
– P → V: 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of G, 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of GT and 4 elements of Zq.
– V → P: dlog2(n)e − 1 elements of Zq.
Second, we consider the amortization scenario where a prover wishes to open many homomorphisms
f1, . . . , fs on one multi-exponentiation P , i.e., we consider a compressed Σ-protocol for the following relation
RAmorHom =
{
(P, y1, . . . , ys; x) : P = gx, y1 = f1(x), . . . ys = fs(x)
}
. (5)
This scenario is reduced to the original scenario of opening one homomorphism on one commitment
by means of a standard polynomial amortization trick. In the first move of the protocol, the verifier sends
a random challenge ρ ∈ Zq to the prover, and then Πc is executed on the instance given by P = gx,
fρ = f1 + ρf2 + · · ·+ ρs−1fs and yρ = y1 + ρy2 + · · ·+ ρs−1ys.
The core idea behind this construction is the observation that if x satisfies fρ(x) = yρ for s distinct choices
of ρ then fi(x) = yi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. A caveat is that when trying to extract such an x by rewinding
s− 1 times and choosing different ρ’s, one might potentially extract different choices of x’s. However, since
gx = P must still hold, this would lead to a non-trivial DL relation among the gi’s, and thus cannot happen
when the prover is computationally bounded.
The properties of this protocol for relation RAmorHom, denoted by ΠAmorHom, are summarized in Theo-
rem 5. Note that the communication from prover to verifier is identical to that of protocol Πc. However, the
polynomial amortization trick degrades the soundness from unconditional to computational because of the
above reason.
Theorem 5 (Amortization over Many Homomorphisms). Let n > 2, then ΠAmorHom is a (2µ+ 4)-
move protocol for relation RAmorHom, where µ = dlog2(n)e−2. It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge and computationally (s, 2, k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption
in G, where ki = 3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ µ. Moreover, the communication costs are:
– P → V: 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of G, 2 dlog2(n)e − 3 elements of GT and 4 elements of Zq.
– V → P: dlog2(n)e elements of Zq.
In the above claim on the computational special soundness we take it as understood that g1, . . . , gn are
chosen uniformly at random in G.
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Proof. Completeness and SHVZK follow directly from the corresponding properties of Protocol Πc.
Special Soundness: From the proof of Theorem 3 we know that for every ρ there exists an efficient
algorithm that, from any (2, 3, . . . , 3)-tree (depth µ + 1) of accepting transcripts, extracts a witness z such
that gz = P and fρ(z) = y1 + ρy2 + · · ·+ ρs−1ys.
We show that there also exists an efficient algorithm that, from s exponents z1, . . . , zs ∈ Znq such that
gzi = P and fρi(zi) = y1 + ρiy2 + · · ·+ ρs−1i ys for all i and for pairwise distinct challenges ρi ∈ Zq, extracts
either a non-trivial DL-relation for the public parameters g or a witness for relation RAmorHom. Combin-
ing these two results shows that Protocol ΠAmorHom is (s, 2, 3, . . . , 3)-special sound from which knowledge
soundness follows from [AC20].
First suppose that there exist 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s such that zi 6= zj . Then gzi = P = gzj gives a non-trivial
DL-relation, which completes the proof for this case.
Now suppose that zi = z for all i. Let (ai,j)1≤i,j≤s be the inverse of the Vandermonde matrix generated
by the challenges ρ1, . . . , ρs, i.e.,  1 · · · 1... . . . ...
ρs1 · · · ρss

a1,1 · · · a1,s... . . . ...
as,1 · · · as,s
 = Is.
Note that this Vandermonde matrix is invertible because the challenges are pairwise distinct. Then for all
1 ≤ i ≤ s it holds that
fi(z) = a1,ifρ1(z) + · · ·+ as,ifρs(z) = yi.
Hence z is a witness for relation RAmorHom which completes the proof.
4 Proving Partial Knowledge
Here, we show our new efficient proofs for partial knowledge, i.e., for proving knowledge of k-out-of-n discrete
logarithms (Section 4.1), and for proving knowledge of k-out-of-n commitment openings (Section 4.2). As we
will see, these new proofs of partial knowledge follow quite easily by exploiting the core idea of the general
construction in [CDS94] and combining it with the techniques and results from the section above. This further
demonstrates the strength of combining the compression technique introduced by [BCC+16, BBB+18] with
general Σ-protocol theory.
4.1 Partial Knowledge of DL’s
In this section we construct a simple SHVZK proof of knowledge for proving knowledge of k-out-of-n discrete
logarithms. Our protocol inherits the logarithmic communication from the compressed Σ-protocol(s) from
the previous section. More precisely, we give a SHVZK protocol for the following relation
RPartial =
{ (
g, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};S ⊂ {1, . . . , n},x ∈ Znq
)
:




Note that, for notational convenience, the witness x is defined as a vector in Znq while only the k coefficients
(xi)i∈S are relevant in this relation.
The protocol goes as follows. First, the prover computes the unique polynomial





of degree at most n− k such that p(0) = 1 and p(i) = 0 for all i /∈ S.
Second, the prover computes
ti := p(i)xi
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for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (recall that p(i) vanishes for those i for which the prover does not know xi), and sends a
Pedersen commitment P ∈ G to the vector
y = (a1, . . . , an−k, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Z2n−kq
to the verifier. Here, the commitment P is computed as P = gyhγ with respect to public parameters
g = (g1, . . . , g2n−k) ∈ G2n−k and h ∈ G for which no non-trivial DL-relations are known to the prover, i.e.,
so that the commitment is indeed binding.
Finally, the prover proves to the verifier that the committed vector y satisfies
gti = P p(i)i (7)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where the exponent p(i) on the right-hand-side term is understood as the evaluation
of the affine function (w1, . . . , wn−k) 7→ 1 +
∑n−k
j=1 wji







i = Pi (8)
we obtain an expression where the left hand side is a group homomorphism f applied to the committed
committed vector y, and thus the prover can prove one instance of (7) by means of the compressed protocol
from Theorem 3; respectively, for improved efficiency, it can invoke the amortized protocol ΠAmorHom from
Theorem 5 for proving that (7) holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The resulting protocol, denoted ΠPartial, is summarized below in Protocol 3. We note that, in line with
the amortized protocol it uses as a subroutine, it is computationally special sound, based on the assumption
that the prover does not know any non-trivial DL-relations among the public parameters. The security and
efficiency properties of ΠPartial are formally described in Theorem 6.
Protocol 3 SHVZK Proof of Partial Knowledge ΠPartial for Relation RPartial
Proving knowledge of k-out-of-n discrete logarithms.
Public Parameters : g ∈ G2n−k, h ∈ G
Input (g, P1, . . . , Pn, k;S,x)
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |S| = k
gxi = Pi for i ∈ S
Prover Verifier




p(i) = 0 ∀i /∈ S
y = (a1, . . . , an−k,
p(1)x1, . . . , p(n)xn)
γ ←R Zq, P = gyhγ
P−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→







i = Pi ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Theorem 6 (k-out-of-n SHVZK Proof of Partial Knowledge). Let n > 1, then ΠPartial is a (2µ+5)-
move protocol for relation RPartial, where µ = dlog2(2n− k + 1)e−2. It is perfectly complete, special honest-
verifier zero-knowledge and computationally (n, 2, k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound, under the discrete logarithm as-
sumption in G, where ki = 3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ µ. Moreover, the communication costs are:
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– P → V: 4 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e − 5 elements of G and 4 elements of Zq.
– V → P: dlog2(2n− k + 1)e elements of Zq.
Proof. Completeness follows in a straightforward manner.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge follows immediately from the fact that P is uniformly
random and from the corresponding zero-knowledge property of ΠAmorHom.
Special Soundness: The computational special soundness of ΠAmorHom guarantees existence of
an extractor that extracts, from any computationally-bounded successful prover, an opening y =
(a1, . . . , an−k, t1, . . . , tn) of the commitment P for which (8) holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and thus, con-
sidering the corresponding polynomial p(X) = 1 +
∑n−k
j=1 ajX
j , for which (7) holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Given the bounded degree of p and the non-zero constant coefficient, p(i) = 0 for at most n − k choices of
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, setting S := {i : p(i) 6=0}, we have |S| ≥ k, and for any i ∈ S we can set xi := ti/p(i)
and (7) then implies that gxi = Pi.
4.2 Partial Knowledge of Commitment Openings
In the previous section we constructed a protocol for proving knowledge of k-out-of-n discrete logarithms
or, equivalently, a protocol for showing that a prover can open k-out-of-n Pedersen commitments to 0. This
protocol can easily be adapted to accommodate, for example, the following variation of this zero-knowledge
scenario.
In this variation we let P1, . . . , Pn be Pedersen commitments, for which the prover claims to know k-out-




g, h, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq,
γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Zq
)




A proof of knowledge for relation RPartialCom is obtained by applying the following adaptations. After
defining the the polynomial p(X) as before, the prover computes
ti := p(i)xi ∈ Zq and si := p(i)γi ∈ Zq,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and sends a Pedersen commitment P ∈ G to the vector
y = (a1, . . . , an−k, t1, . . . , tn, s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Z3n−kq ,








for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Formally, we have the following security and efficiency properties.
Theorem 7 (k-out-of-n SHVZK Proof of Partial Knowledge for Commitment Openings).
ΠPartialCom is a (2µ + 5)-move protocol for relation RPartialCom, where µ = dlog2 (3n− k + 1)e − 2. It is
perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally (n, 2, k1, . . . , kµ)-special sound,
under the discrete logarithm assumption in G, where ki = 3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ µ. Moreover, the communication
costs are:
– P → V: 4 dlog2 (3n− k + 1)e − 5 elements of G and 4 elements of Zq.
– V → P: dlog2 (3n− k + 1)e elements of Zq.
5 The element h ∈ G, used in the commitments Pi, is not necessarily the same element as the element h ∈ G used
in the Pedersen vector commitment P of Protocol ΠPartial.
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Remark 2. We emphasize that ΠPartialCom is only special sound under the assumption that the prover does
not know a non-trivial DL relation between the public parameters g ∈ G3n−k and h ∈ G for the Pedersen
commitment P to the vector y, i.e., it is crucial that the commitment P is binding. By contrast, the special
soundness of ΠPartialCom does not depend on a computational assumption regarding the public parameters
g, h ∈ G for the Pedersen commitments Pi, i.e., the commitments Pi are not required to be binding for
Protocol ΠPartialCom to be special sound.
5 Extensions and Generalizations
Our techniques from Section 4 for proofs of partial knowledge can be extended and generalized in various
directions. We discuss some examples here.
5.1 Pairing Based Commitments to Reduce the Communication Complexity
We show here that by introducing a pairing and considering a pairing based extension of Pedersen’s vector
commitment scheme (see below), we can incorporate a trick from [BBB+18] to reduce the relevant constant
by another factor up to 2.
Recall that, rather than a general homomorphisms f : Znq → GT , [AC20] considers the special case of a
linear form L : Znq → Zq, with the goal to prove that a secret vector x ∈ Znq , committed to as P = gxhγ ,
satisfies L(x) = y for a publicly known P and y. The trick then is to include y into the commitment by
considering P ′ = gxhγky instead, and proving it to be of the claimed form using a Σ-protocol and then
compressing it. The gained advantage is not that y becomes hidden in the commitment— y is still known,
and P ′ would actually be computed by the verifier from P and y—but that the public information is reduced
to a single group element. In the language of our general view (Appendix A), Protocol 4 is applied to the
homomorphism Znq → GT , x 7→ gxhγkL(x), rather than to Znq → GT × Zq, x 7→ (gxhγ , L(x)). Thereby, in
every recursion of the compression mechanism, each “cross term” consist of just one element in GT now,
rather than a pair in GT × Zq. Overall this reduces the communication costs by roughly a factor up to 2,
depending on the choice of the group GT and the representation of its elements.
To apply this approach to our scenario, and incorporate f(x) ∈ GT into the commitment, we require a
compact vector commitment scheme for vectors (x, y) ∈ Znq × GT , which have coefficients in both Zq and
GT . Under bilinear pairing assumptions these commitment schemes exist [AFG+16, LMR19]. Namely, let
us assume that there exists a group G2 of prime order q, and a bilinear pairing e : GT × G2 → G. For
public parameters g ∈ Gn, h ∈ G and R ∈ G2 sampled uniformly at random, we can define the following
commitment scheme:
com′ : Znq ×GT × Zq → G, (x, y, γ) 7→ gxhγe(y,R), (10)
where γ ∈ Zq is chosen uniformly at random to commit to an element (x, y) ∈ Znq ×GT . This commitment
scheme is unconditionally hiding and binding under the assumption that the prover does not know a non-
zero vector (x, y, γ) ∈ Znq × GT × Zq such that gxhγe(y,R) = 1 ∈ G. This assumptions is implied by the
double pairing (DBP) assumption, which is in turn implied by the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption over
GT [AFG+16, LMR19].
A more efficient protocol for opening arbitrary homomorphisms f : Znq → GT is now obtained by
replacing the Pedersen vector commitment scheme by this pairing based commitment scheme that allows
the group element f(x) to be incorporated into the commitment. The resulting compressed Σ-protocol
for opening homomorphisms is derived as in Section 3, but with the generic compression Protocol 4 now
instantiated with the group homomorphism Zn+1q → G, (x, γ) 7→ gxhγe(cf(x), R), for a random challenge
c ∈ Zq, rather than Zn+1q → G × GT , (x, γ) 7→ (gxhγ , f(x)). Applying this modification to the k-out-of-n
proof of partial knowledge (Protocol 3) results in communication costs, from prover to verifier, of exactly
2 dlog2(2n− k + 1)e − 1 elements of G and 4 elements of Zq.
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5.2 Multi-Exponentiations and Vector Commitments
A straightforward generalization of Protocol ΠPartial shows that, instead of the DL problem for standard
exponentiations, we can also consider multi-exponentiations. More concretely, this generalization gives a
protocol for the following relation
R′ =
{(
h ∈ Gm, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};S ⊂ {1, . . . , n},x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Zmq
)
:




The only adaptation of protocol ΠPartial that is required is the replacement of the scalars xi ∈ Zq
by vectors xi ∈ Zmq . The communication complexity of the resulting protocol grows logarithmically in the
dimension m of the multi-exponentiations. In a completely analogous manner, protocol ΠPartialCom from
Section 4.2 can be generalized to proving partial knowledge of Pedersen vector commitment openings.
5.3 Plug and Play with Circuit Zero-Knowledge
In many practical scenarios, one wishes to prove not only partial knowledge of commitment openings, but
also that the committed values satisfy some additional constraints. Typically these constraints are defined
by an arithmetic circuit C : Znq → Zq and the committed values x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq are claimed to satisfy




g, h, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq,
γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Zq
)




Note that in this relation the prover is only committed to k-out-of-n scalars xi, i.e., it can choose n − k
scalars freely.
To handle this extension of the partial knowledge scenario we deploy the circuit ZK techniques
from [AC20]. For these techniques to be applicable all we need to show is that we can open homomor-
phisms and linear forms on the same Pedersen vector commitment. In [AC20] it is namely shown how circuit
ZK protocols, for arbitrary arithmetic circuits, are derived from the functionality of opening linear forms on
Pedersen vector commitments.
However, for any homomorphism f : Znq → GT and any linear form L : Znq → Zq it is easily seen that the
following map is again a homomorphism
(f, L) : Znq → GT × Zq x 7→ (f(x), L(x)).
So the functionality of Protocol Πc, opening homomorphism, trivially extends to the functionality of opening
homomorphism and linear forms on the same vector commitment.
Applying this approach directly results in a protocol for relation RPartialCirc where the communication
costs, from prover to verifier, are roughly 6 log2(n) elements. These communication costs can be reduced to
roughly 4 log2(n) elements, or 2 log2(n) on a pairing based platform, by applying the techniques from Sec-
tion 5.1 and [AC20].
Remark 3. Various other (natural) circuit ZK scenarios exist. For example, when the circuit C : Zkq → Zq
only takes the scalars xi for i ∈ S as input. Many of these scenarios are easily dealt with by plug and play
(modular design) with the techniques from [AC20].
5.4 General Access Structures
Thus far, we have restricted ourselves to provers that claim to know the solutions of some (secret) subset
S, of cardinality at least k, of n (public) DL problems Pi = gxi , i.e., the secret subset S is an element of a
threshold access structure
Γk,n = {A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} : |A| ≥ k} ⊂ 2{1,...,n}.
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Here, we describe how the protocols from Section 4 can easily be generalized to arbitrary monotone access
structures Γ ⊂ 2{1,...,n}, i.e., to provers that claim to know the solutions of some subset of S ∈ Γ of n DL
problems. Recall that Γ is called a monotone access structure if for all A ∈ Γ and for all B ⊃ A it holds
that B ∈ Γ . The proofs of partial knowledge of [CDS94] already considered arbitrary access structures and
we adapt their techniques by combining it with our compression framework.
Our proofs of k-out-of-n partial knowledge implicitly deploy a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) for
access structure Γ ∗k,n = Γn−k,n. Here, Γ ∗ denotes the dual of access structure, generally given by
Γ ∗ = {A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} : Ac /∈ Γ}.




j defines a secret sharing of the field element 1.
To construct a proof of partial knowledge for monotone access structure Γ we simply replace p(i) by the
i-th share (which may consist of several field elements, depending on the expansion factor) of a linear secret
sharing of 1, with the randomness chosen so that the “right” shares (i.e, those corresponding to the xi’s that
the prover does not know) vanish.
Note that an honest prover knows (xi)i∈S for some S ∈ Γ . Hence, Sc /∈ Γ ∗ and for this reason the
appropriate secret sharing of 1 exists, showing completeness of the generalized proof of partial knowledge.
Special soundness follows from the following observation. Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the subset for which all
the corresponding shares vanish. Then, by linearity of the secret sharing scheme and since the secret sharing
reconstructs to 1, it follows that A /∈ Γ ∗. Hence, Ac ∈ Γ and special soundness follows as before.
The communication complexity of the resulting protocol depends logarithmically on the size of the LSSS
for Γ ∗, which is given by the monotone-span-program complexity of Γ ∗ [SJM91] and which coincides with
the monotone-span-program complexity of Γ [Gál95].
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A General View on the Compression
We consider here the natural generalization of the compression Protocol 2 to an arbitrary group homomor-
phism Ψ : H → G for groups H and G of prime order q and for which H is a direct sum H = H′ ⊕ H′ of a
group H′ with itself. Thus, any x ∈ H can be written as a tuple x = (xL, xR) of group elements xL, xR ∈ H′.
By convention, we write H′, and thus H, as an additive group and G as a multiplicative group. Protocol 4,
denoted by ΠΨ , below is a proof of knowledge for the relation
RΨ =
{
(P ;x) ∈ G×H : Ψ(x) = P
}
.
Its properties are summarized in the following theorem. The proof is along the very same lines as the proof
of Theorem 2, with obvious adjustments. We provide it here for completeness.
Theorem 8 (General Compression Mechanism). Let H = H′ ⊕H′ for some group H′. Then ΠΨ is a
3-move protocol for relation RΨ . It is perfectly complete and unconditionally 3-special sound. Moreover, the
communication costs are:
– P → V: 2 elements of G and 1 elements of H′.
– V → P: 1 element of Zq.
Proof. Completeness follows directly.
Special Soundness: We show that the protocol is 3-special sound. Let (A,B, c1, z1), (A,B, c2, z2) and
(A,B, c3, z3) be three accepting transcripts for distinct challenges c1, c2, c3 ∈ Zq. Let a1, a2, a3 ∈ Zq be such












Note that, since the challenges are distinct, this Vandermonde matrix is invertible and a solution to this
equation exists. We define z̄ =
∑3
i=1 ai(cizi, zi) for which it is easily verified that Ψ(z̄) = P . Hence, z̄ is a
witness for relation RΨ , which completes the proof.
Protocol 4 Generic Compression Mechanism ΠΨ for relation RΨ .
Input(P ;x = (xL, xR))
P = Ψ(xL, xR) ∈ GT
Prover Verifier




z = xL + cxR
z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ψ(cz, z) ?= AP cBc
2
Considering the setting of Section 3 and instantiating Ψ with Ψ : Znq → G×GT , x 7→ (gx, f(x)) for the
considered group homomorphism f : Znq → GT , with n assumed to be even so that Znq = Z
n/2
q ⊕ Zn/2q , we
recover the relation Rf and Protocol 2 from Section 3. Similarly, we recover the pairing-based compression
protocol of Section 5.1 by instantiating Ψ with Ψ : Znq → G, x 7→ gxe(f(x), R).
Consider the final verification Ψ(cz, z) ?= AP cBc2 in Protocol 4. In line with Protocol 2 in Section 3,
when we define, for an arbitrary given c ∈ Zq, the group homomorphism Ψ ′ : H′ → G, z 7→ Ψ(cz, z) and the
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group element P ′ = AP cBc2 , we observe that the final verification step in Protocol 4 is to check if (P, z)
satisfies the relation RΨ ′ . Therefore, if H′ happens to again be a direct sum H′ = H′′ ⊕ H′′ of a group H′′
with itself, we can replace the last communication and verification step in Protocol 2 by an execution of
Protocol 2 for the relation RΨ ′ . Thus, if H is actually the n-fold direct sum of a group H◦ with itself for n
a power of 2 (which we may assume without loss of generality), we obtain a proof of knowledge for relation
RΨ , where the communication costs, from prover to verifier, are 2 log(n) elements of G and 1 element of H◦.
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